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Abstract 
Macroeconomic downturns can have both an important impact on the availability of informal care and the 
affordability of formal long-term care. This paper investigates how the demand for and provision of informal care 
changed during and after the Great Recession in Europe. We use data from the Survey of Health, Aging and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which includes a rich set of variables covering waves before and after the Great 
Recession. We find evidence of an increase in the availability of informal care and a reduction in the use of formal 
health services (doctor visits and hospital stays) after the economic downturn when controlling for year and 
country fixed effects. This trend is mainly driven by changes in care provision of individuals not cohabiting with 
the care recipient. We also find a small negative association between old-age health (measured be the number of 
problems with activities of daily living) and crisis severity. The results are robust to the inclusion of individual 
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often confronted with the question of how to influence the provision of informal care in the
short term. This need raises the issue as to how the demand for and supply of informal
care is determined. A sharp change in economic conditions can be useful to learn more
about these determinants. In this paper, we will exploit the unemployment shock caused
by the Great Recession to look at the relationship between informal care availability and
macroeconomic fluctuations, and to explore potential mechanisms that can explain the
demand for formal and informal LTC, such as changes in household incomes, care needs,
and the opportunity cost of time of caregivers.
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between macroeconomic downturns
and health outcomes and inputs. In general, the recent literature finds a counter-cyclical
pattern of health – health improves when the economy deteriorates, and there is some
evidence of increased use of medical care in good economic times.1 For instance, an
inverse relationship between total mortality and unemployment rates is found using data
on US states (Ruhm, 2000), 16 German states (Neumayer, 2004), and 23 OECD countries
(Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006). Applying individual-level survey data from the US, Ruhm
(2003) finds, using 5 different measures of health status, that health tends to improve with
increasing state unemployment rates. The relationship is strongest for the population of
working age and for acute health conditions. In addition, Ruhm (2000, 2003) finds that
health improvements occur even though the use of medical care (the number of routine
check-ups, screening tests, doctor visits and hospital stays) declines in bad economic
times.2
1See Ruhm (2012) for a further review of the literature. The observation that health is a counter-
cyclical variable was contrary to conventional knowledge gained from early evidence using time series
data, see Ruhm (2000) and references therein.
2The decreased use of medical care in the US might be a consequence of lower insurance coverage
following a fall in economic activity. Cawley and Simon (2005) and Cawley et al. (2015) find that state
unemployment rates are negatively related to insurance coverage. However, Ruhm (2003) argue that
this is unlikely since the associations are just as strong for sub-samples less affected by fluctuations in
insurance coverage, and the relationship is still intact after controlling for income.
2
1 Introduction
Informal caregiving refers to unpaid care provided by family members, friends, and chari-
ties, to individuals in need of help with everyday tasks. Such care is still to date the most
common source of long-term care (Arno et al., 1999; Karlsson et al., 2006; Grabowski
et al., 2012). Slow-moving effects of aging and changes in social norms step by step mod-
ify the demand for long term care (including informal care); however, policy makers are
some evidence of the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and health among
older adults. Noelke and Beckfield (2014) find, using a sample of US adults aged 50 years
and older, that mortality increases among those who experience a job loss. Likewise,
the self-perceived health of a sample in the same age group from 9 European countries,
seems to deteriorate in downturns (Bucher-Koenen and Mazzonna, 2013), and Cutler
et al. (2002) find an increased mortality rate among older Mexicans in crisis years. Thus,
these studies suggest that old-age health shows a pro-cyclical pattern. However, a study
using Norwegian registry data (Haaland and Telle, 2015), shows that disability is pro-
cyclical (i.e. an indication of health being counter-cyclical) for older adults in Norway.
Long-term care is especially interesting since the market is dominated by informal (un-
paid) care and public sector funds (Grabowski et al., 2012; Kotsadam, 2012; Colombo
et al., 2011).
Second, the demand for and supply of long-term care (LTC) – health and social services
provided to persons who, often related to age, have difficulty in maintaining daily life due
to a disability – are determined by very different forces compared to those determining
health care needs and utilisation. In most societies, the LTC sector is dominated by
informal care provided by (mostly) unpaid family members, friends, neighbours or other
acquaintances. Besides, in most OECD countries, the bulk of the expenditure for formal
LTC is public (Grabowski et al., 2012; Karlsson et al., 2007; Colombo et al., 2011) and
the proportion of public spending is in general higher than for health care (Lipszyc
et al., 2012).3 Both public sector funds for LTC and health services, and informal care
availability are expected to be affected by economic downturns. The growth of total
and public expenditure for health and social services tends to slow down in recessionary
periods (Keegan et al., 2013; Cylus et al., 2012).
3Colombo et al. (2011) find in a sample of 25 OECD countries that the public share of LTC expenditure
is 75 percent. Looking only at the 18 European countries in the sample, the public share is 88 percent,
and disregarding Switzerland, which with a public share of 38 percent is in this respect an outlier, the
share is above 90 percent. See figure 1.8, on page 46, and the corresponding data in Colombo et al.
(2011).
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To our knowledge, there is little evidence on the relationship between macroeconomic
fluctuations and various outcomes related to health and long-term care for older people.
There are at least three reasons why this relationship is important and interesting to
study. First, it is unlikely that the theoretical predictions and empirical results of the
previous studies apply equally to the older population. The empirical analyses focus on
the working-age population and find stronger effects for acute health conditions than for
chronic illnesses. The hypotheses for the observed countercyclical pattern of health in-
clude more time for health improving activities (exercise), less exposure to adverse health
outcomes related to work (job-related stress, pollution, accidents), and less drinking and
driving (Ruhm, 2000; Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006). All these behavioural responses, and
especially the two first, are less relevant for the older (non-working) population. There is
between this opportunity cost and the business cycle is far from straightforward. It might
even be the case that the opportunity cost of time of the traditional caregivers increases
during hard economic times. For example, caregiving responsibilities are high close to
retirement (Kotsadam, 2011), and a fall in household incomes caused by a recession might
induce people to postpone retirement (Meschi et al., 2013). A fall in household incomes
(potentially caused by the loss of employment of the breadwinner) might also induce
informal caregivers to seek employment outside the household.5
The traditional way to think about recessions in economics is that they first and foremost
increase leisure time (Bettio et al., 2012)6; however, this view is challenged by Aguiar
et al. (2013) who analyse the American Time Use Survey and, after controlling for trends
in leisure and household production, find that 30 percent of the time freed from reduced
work hours in the recent recession are allocated to non-market production. According
to Bettio et al. (2012), there is no comparable evidence of time use in recessions from
Europe.
A third reason to devote particular attention to social care needs, is that the LTC systems
of European countries exhibit striking and interesting institutional differences, which
make them a useful setting for a comparative case study. Whereas there is evidence of
convergence in the European health care systems (Schmid et al., 2010), national LTC
systems tend to exhibit a great degree of persistence and path-dependence (Karlsson
et al., 2007, 2010). Thus, important differences persist in many of the dimensions that
define a LTC system (Wittenberg et al., 2002) such as the role of the family in provision
of care (Bolin et al., 2008b; Kotsadam, 2011), the balance between residential and home-
based services, and the form of the public subsidy (Pommer et al., 2007). Since the last
crisis appears to have had a heterogeneous impact even between countries with similar
LTC institutions, a comparison between different European regions may tell us something
about the robustness of their respective LTC systems to changing economic conditions.
This exercise may thus be thought of as a stress test of the challenges ahead when
population ageing reaches its full impact on LTC systems in a few decades’ time.
5This is likely to be more relevant in developing countries, see e.g. Cutler et al. (2002).
6The neo-classical perspective to understand The Great Depression and The Great Recession is to
understand “why the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure was so low relative
to the marginal product of labor” (Ohanian, 2010).
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A reduction in the growth of public spending may be particularly relevant for LTC since an
ageing population combined with falling birth rates and higher labor market participation
of women (i.e. decreased supply of informal care) will increase the demand for formal
LTC (Siciliani, 2013).4 As noted in Bettio et al. (2012), recessions do not curb the ageing
of the population, and therefore the demand for LTC will continue to increase. The
question is then, whether informal caregiving will meet the increased demand for LTC
in times when public funds are strained. The rate of unemployment is closely related to
the supply of informal care, since the decision to provide informal care primarily depends
on the the opportunity cost of time (Grabowski et al., 2012). However, the relationship
4Siciliani (2013) and Colombo (2012) refer to projections by the European commission in which LTC
expenditure will double in most European countries by 2060.
from output peak-to-trough. We use data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Re-
tirement in Europe (SHARE), which includes a rich set of variables covering waves from
before and after the Great Recession. Our main finding is that the proportion receiving
and providing informal care increases when the economy deteriorates, and the result is
driven by increased supply of extra-residential informal care. For example, controlling for
time trends, individual-specific effects and demographic characteristics, a one-percentage
point increase in unemployment from peak-to-trough is associated with a 0.84 percent-
age point (4.6%) increase in the probability of receiving extra-residential informal care.
Moreover, we find that trends in informal caregiving during the recession were very het-
erogeneous across LTC systems: the associations in the Northern and Southern regions
correspond to an increase of about 22 and 2 percent, respectively – with the other groups
of countries in between. We hypothesize that this can be because there are more intensive
informal caregivers in the family-based system of elderly care of Southern Europe that
take on the whole responsibility of dependent elderly, and that these are less affected by
a weaker economy (i.e. changes in the opportunity cost of time).
Interestingly, we find a negative association between old-age health (measured by the
number of problems with activities of daily living), formal care use (doctor visits and
hospital stays), and recession severity. These effects are relatively small: an increase in
unemployment by one percentage point is associated with 0.014 additional ADLs failing,
or with a reduction in doctor visits by 3-4 per cent. Being aware of the bad controls
problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), we include measures of care needs and economic
well-being as control variables to explore if the estimated associations are robust. The
results are only slightly attenuated. To explore the role of opportunity cost of time, we
estimate the probability of providing informal care separately for respondents who are
unemployed and employed before the recession. Among the employed, who are most likely
to experience a change in the opportunity cost of time, a one-percentage point increase in
our crisis measure is associated with a 1.24-point increase in the probability of providing
informal care, which roughly corresponds to 2.7 percent at the sample average. The
corresponding association among unemployed is 0.73 percentage points (2.2%), albeit the
association is not statistically significant. Therefore, it seems that the results are partly
driven by changes in opportunity cost of time.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next we we discuss the underlying determinants
of informal care receipt and provision. Then we discuss the empirical strategy. Section
five reports the results and a final section discusses the results and concludes.
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The Great Recession is the worst global recession since World War II, and the impact
of the recession was heterogeneous across European countries (EC, 2009). This resulted
in significant variation in unemployment rates across European countries and over time,
which allows us to estimate the relationship between recession severity and receipt and
provision of informal care, while controlling for country-specific, time-specific and region-
specific time trends. Our measure of recession severity is the increase in unemployment
2 Informal Care in Times of Crisis
A large-scale macroeconomic shock like the Great Recession is of course bound to have
an impact also on the long-term care system in the affected countries. We will now seek
to outline the various ways in which the economic crisis may have had an impact on
the supply of and demand for formal and informal care. Our focus is on informal care,
but since formal care is a close substitute for informal care, we also need to consider the
determinants of formal care provision.
The most immediate ways in which the crisis may have an impact on demand for
informal care is through a) physical care needs, b) the public provision of formal care,
and c) household incomes. Care needs may be affected by the crisis either by an
immediate drop in incomes – to the extent that incomes causally affect care needs – or
through reductions in medical spending which may lead to a deterioration in health. It
has also been postulated that the business cycle has an independent effect on health, but
it is questionable if this applies to the elderly population. The provision of formal
care is likely to be affected when public finances are squeezed, and, depending on the
substitutability of formal and informal care, this will lead to an increased demand for
informal care – even in the absence of an effect on physical care needs. Finally, when
household incomes are affected by the crisis, the demand for informal (unpaid) care is
likely to increase correspondingly as people turn away from formal care services.
There are also various ways in which the crisis may affect the supply of informal care,
most importantly: a) public support for informal carers, and b) the opportunity
cost of care provision. These two channels obviously operate in opposite directions: a
reduced public support is likely to reduce supply, whereas the reduced opportunity cost
is going to increase supply. The net effect thus remains an open issue.
Informal care can be provided by co-resident caregivers (e.g., children and spouses) or by
non-co-residents; both children, friends and neighbours. The latter is estimated to make
30% of the total informal care in Europe Kalwij et al. (2014). However, social networks,
may also be affected by the crisis. This effect may be negative – for example if the stress
associated with the crisis harms social networks qualitatively or quantitatively. On the
other hand, the crisis might actually also further social networks, for example if there is
less mobility induced by the labour market.
2.1 Demand-Side Factors
The most obvious factor determining demand for LTC is probably functional limitations
and health in the older population (Altindag et al., 2012). In a series of seminal pa-
6
pers, Christopher Ruhm has analysed the impact of macroeconomic conditions on health
(Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2004). A general finding in this literature is that health and survival
exhibit a countercyclical behaviour, which seems to be partly due to external factors (ac-
cidents etc) and partly due to behaviours. Whether these findings also apply to long-term
care remains an open issue, since they a) focus on the working-age population and b)
find stronger effects for acute health conditions than for chronic illness.
A related literature considers economic conditions at the individual level and looks for
credible sources of identification. There is an abundance of empirical work showing that
household incomes and other measures of socioeconomic status – for example education
or occupation – correlate with health at the individual level. These relationships are
also visible for functional limitations and care needs at older ages in Europe (Majo and
Van Soest, 2011) as well as North America: in the U.S., older people with two or more
ADLs failing have annual incomes more than $15,000 below those without functional
limitations (Johnson et al., 2013). However, it is not generally accepted that the observed
relationships are causal (Fischer et al., 2013). The few empirical studies which seek to
estimate the causal effect of incomes on health suggests that the effect, if existent, is likely
to be small. Using lottery wins to achieve exogenous variation in incomes, Apouey and
Clark (2014) find modest positive effects on mental health and negative effects on health
related behaviours. The overall effect appears to be very small. Adda et al. (2009) reach
a very similar conclusion using a completely different identification strategy: the effects of
a positive income shock seem to be small, but there is evidence of an increase in mortality
and a slight increase in cigarette consumption. Schmitz (2011) analyses the relationship
between unemployment and health and finds that the association appears to be driven by
selection into unemployment and not by direct causation. Thus, it seems safe to conclude
that an economic crisis is unlikely to have a large direct impact on the needs in the older
population. The health of the elderly population is possibly more dependent on overall
wealth, than on short-term fluctuations in income Costa-Font (2008).
Physical care needs may also be affected by cuts in the public health and long-term
care systems. As mentioned above, such cuts may in fact contribute to two distinct
mechanisms: even if there is no immediate impact of the cuts on physical care needs, the
austerity measure may increase demand for informal care via substitution mechanisms.
We now consider each of these channels in turn.
There is evidence that several governments of OECD countries cut down on health care
expenditure during the crisis (Karanikolos et al., 2013). However, these cuts do not nec-
essarily have a direct impact on the quantity and quality of health care services available
to citizens: in many cases, the cuts were made to salaries of health care personnel, or in
the reference prices of pharmaceuticals. Both these measures are unlikely to have an im-
mediate impact on the quality of the provision of health care. Conversely, changes to the
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scope of coverage of health care systems were rare. However, several countries introduced
or increased user charges, which may have had an impact on utilisation (Karanikolos
et al., 2013).
Even in cases where austerity measures have affected the quality or the coverage of health
care provision – such as in the Netherlands, where physiotherapy was removed from the
benefits package (Mladovsky et al., 2012) – it remains to be established whether the cuts
have had a relevant impact on long-term care needs. Again, there is an identification
problem which makes it difficult to draw clear inference and there is no general agreement
as to whether increases or reductions in coverage lead to discernible changes in population
health (Moreno-Serra and Smith, 2012). Some American studies use the eligibiliy for
Medicare, which leads to a sharp change in health care coverage at age 65, to estimate
the effect in the older population. Card et al. (2007) reports that Medicare eligibility
is associated with a significant reduction in patient mortality. The Oregon experiment,
which randomly assigned health insurance coverage, has also been evaluated in various
studies (Allen, 2015). Finkelstein et al. (2011) observe a positive effect on utilisation
and on self-reported health. The evidence for objective health measures is much more
mixed: no effect was observed for detection of hypertension or indicators such as blood
pressure and cholesterol, but there is some evidence that diabetes was better diagnosed
and treated, and that mental health improved (Baicker et al., 2013).
Also for a given level of physical care needs, austerity measures in the formal care sector
will influence demand for informal care to the extent that these are close substitutes.
There is a large literature analysing the substitutability between formal and informal
care (Siciliani, 2013; Grabowski et al., 2012). Johansson et al. (2003) established that
when the public provision of formal care is reduced, the provision of informal care tends
to increase. However, a recent paper Karlsberg Schaffer (2015) finds that informal care
incresed by 6% after the introduction of a new regulation that subsidized long term care
in Scotland. Instrumenting the availability of informal care, which is endogenous in the
decision to utilise formal care, Bonsang (2009) finds that a 10 per cent reduction in the
availability informal care increases demand for formal care by 6.8 per cent. However,
even if the substitutability between the two types of services may seem straightforward,
it appears to vary strongly across context and between individuals. Bonsang (2009)
finds that the two types of services are substitutes only for low levels of disability and
for low-skilled but not high-skilled formal carers. Kim and Lim (2014) conclude that
informal care is substituted for formal care on the intensive margin only: this finding
seems to highlight the importance of having access to an informal carer. Lee and Kim
(2012) looks into substitutability for various specific chronic conditions and find strong
heterogeneity, and Bolin et al. (2008a) find important differences between regions. In
short, the substitution relationship is well established, but not all types of formal care
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can and will be substituted with informal care for all types of recipients.
The literature has focused on the effect of informal care on formal care (Van Houtven and
Norton, 2004, 2008; Bolin et al., 2008a; Bonsang, 2009). In the US context (Van Houtven
and Norton, 2004, 2008), persons in need of LTC are modelled to choose their use of
formal care after considering the availability of informal care. To control for simultaneity
bias they instrument informal care with family-level variables such as gender and number
of children. The exclusion restriction is that the family-level variables only affects formal
care through informal care. A similar theoretical and empirical framework has also been
applied to the European context using SHARE survey data (Bolin et al., 2008a; Bonsang,
2009). It is questionable whether the US context is directly transferrable to the European
context where LTC is predominately publicly funded and non-price rationed.
Finally, for a given level of need, the demand for informal care may be affected if the
crisis triggers a drop in incomes. However, this potential channel is probably of limited
importance. The pension systems of most OECD countries seem to have weathered the
immediate impact of the crisis relatively well, and the economic downturn – with the as-
sociated negative investment returns – was more of a challenge to the long-term stability
of the pension system. In the short term, pensioners seem not to have experienced a large
setback in pension incomes. In some countries, pensioners even improved their position
compared to the working-age population (DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclu-
sion, 2012). Whenever there were cuts in pensions, they were typically complemented by
means tested benefits designed to mitigate poverty amongst the old (OECD, 2013). In
cases where older people did experience a reduction in incomes, it is likely to lead to a
substitution of informal for formal care. However, the income elasticity of demand for
formal care has been shown to be different in different countries (Bakx et al., 2014).
2.2 Supply-Side Factors
As mentioned above, also the supply side of informal care may be affected by a crisis.
In particular two mechanisms are important in this regard: worsening labour market
prospects may reduce the opportunity costs of providing informal care, and a reduction
in allowances for informal carers may reduce the incentive to provide such care. From an
economic point of view, these two mechanisms have a similar interpretation as they both
relate to the implicit cost of caring in some way. The decision to provide informal care
is usually modelled within a simple labor-leisure model, in which the potential caregiver
takes into account the well-being of the individual in need of care either because of
altruistic or bequest motives (Grabowski et al., 2012; Bolin et al., 2008b; Ettner, 1996).
Informal care provision and labor supply will be determined simultaneously and depend
on the opportunity cost of time (marginal value of consumption/work), the marginal
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utility of leisure and care supply.
A large literature has evolved which considers the connection between labour market
outcomes and informal care provision (Grabowski et al., 2012; Houtven et al., 2013; Lilly
et al., 2007). However, most contributions in this growing literature handle informal
care provision as a ‘treatment’ variable which possibly has an impact on labour market
outcomes, health and well-being. This perspective is quite different from one in which the
economic determinants of care provision are considered. For instance, Heitmueller (2007)
and Bolin et al. (2008b) use, amongst others, health of the receiver of informal care as an
instrument for informal care, while controlling for the health of the caregiver. Fevang et al.
(2012) question the validity of health of the receiver of care as an instrument, due to the
strong intergenerational correlation in health and labor market performance. As noted
by Kotsadam (2011) and Kotsadam (2012), much less is known outside the Anglo-Saxon
countries and very few studies use comparable data from different European countries.
The only studies we know of that look at the impact of labor market status on informal
caregiving are Carmichael et al. (2010) and Stern (1995). They assume employment status
prior to caring responsibilities is exogenous to the current decision to provide informal
care. However, people may have less incentives to invest in a career if they know they
are facing caring obligations in the future. Hence, past labor market outcomes might be
endogenous to future care.
In a recent paper, Skira (2015) does consider the actual optimisation problem faced by the
potential caregiver. Using a structural model which allows for changes in parental health,
human capital accumulation and job availability, the caring and labour market decisions
are analysed. The empirical analysis is based on the Health and Retirement Study and
females between the ages of 42 and 70. Skira considers a range of policy experiments,
such as introducing a paid leave for carers and a carer’s allowance, which is independent
of the labour market status of the recipient. She finds that financial incentives do matter:
introducing paid leave boosts caregiving at all levels of dependence, but the caregiver’s
allowance have an even larger effect on informal care provision. In comparison with a
scenario without financial incentives, the increase in supply ranges from 50 to 100 per
cent.
2.3 Common Factors
Finally, the crisis may have an impact on the social networks of the potential care re-
cipient – and thereby influence the demand and the supply side simultaneously. The
proximity of adult children to their parents is related to the labour market in many
ways. For example, it has been shown that the labour market attachment of females
is positively influenced by the proximity of her mother or a mother-in-law (Compton
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and Pollak, 2014). Likewise, there is evidence suggesting that the adult child’s choice of
location is partly determined by considerations regarding future informal care: having
more siblings on average increases the distance to the parents (Holmlund et al., 2013).
Some economics papers thus model the proximity between parents and their children as
a game of reciprocity, where the location is determined by several factors which change
the incentives to involve in a reciprocity game. Johar et al. (2014) show that parental
assets and their care needs are important determinants of co-residence. However, it is
unclear how a changing labour market affects the incentives to live close to or far away
from parents. On the one hand, the crisis could lead to an increase in coresidence for
economic reasons. On the other hand, a daunting local labour market may spur migration
and thereby increase the distance between parents and children. It thus remains an open
issue whether the crisis changes the availability of informal carers.
2.4 Conclusion
We have considered a wide range of mechanisms over which the macroeconomic situation
might influence the size of the informal care sector. Amongst the demand-side factors,
we considered a direct impact of the crisis on physical care needs, and an indirect impact
mediated by cuts in the health care system. Further demand-side factors include substi-
tution away from formal LTC, due to cuts in the public support system, and a reduction
in incomes. Our conclusion concerning demand-side factors is that the crisis is unlikely to
have had a large direct effect on care needs, but that there might be some effects arising
from reduced access to health care. However, a fairly long exposure would probably be
required for this channel to have any significant importance. On the other hand, there
is reason to believe that cuts in the formal LTC system may have triggered an increased
demand for informal care due to substitution. The substitutability between formal and
informal care is well-documented in the literature, even though the elasticity appears to
vary between different groups.
As regards supply-side factors, we considered two mechanisms which both affect the
opportunity cost of caring: cash transfers to informal carers, and the wage rate earned
on the labour market by potential carers. Both of these may be affected in various ways
by the crisis, and they are likely to matter quite a lot for the supply of informal care.
Finally, we considered social networks as an additional factors which affects demand
for and supply of informal care simultaneously. For this variable, there is quite some
evidence that it is affected by the macroeconomic situation, but the sign of the effect
remains unclear.
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3 Data, Sample Selection and Variables
Our empirical analysis is based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Eu-
rope (SHARE). The SHARE database is a multi-disciplinary survey of the population
aged 50 years and older in 18 European countries. It was created to inform about soci-
etal consequences of population ageing across different institutional contexts in Europe
(Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2013). The data have been collected in three regular panel waves:
wave 1 (2004/05); wave 2 (2006/07); and wave 4 (2010/11). In addition, one wave of
data (wave 3; 2008/09) was designed exclusively to gather information on retrospective
life histories of the respondents. We do not use wave 3 because it does not contain any
information on informal care use. The target population for SHARE are all persons who
are 50 years and older in the respective survey year and their partners at any age. The
survey has a longitudinal dimension in that all respondents who have previously partic-
ipated are eligible to be interviewed in future waves (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2013).7 The
SHARE database is particularly useful in our context because it includes detailed infor-
mation on health status, informal care, demographics and socioeconomic status and, in
particular, samples are taken before (wave 1 and 2) and after the financial crisis (wave
4).
We estimate the availability of informal care before and after the crisis. Therefore, we
are only using countries that participated in the survey before and after the financial
crisis. This leaves out Estonia, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia that joined the survey
in wave 4, and Greece, Ireland and Israel that did not participate in the survey after
wave 3. In addition, Switzerland is dropped from the sample because we do not have
any information on our measures of crisis severity from this country. The data we use
to describe the severity of the crisis is described in more detail in section 3.2. After we
discard observations that have missing values in the variables of interest we are left with
88,553 observations across 11 countries8, which we divide into the following geographic
regions: Sweden and Denmark (North); Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, and
Belgium (Central); Spain and Italy (South); and Poland and the Czech Republic (East).9
7For more in-depth information on survey design and other methodological issues see Alcser et al.
(2005) and Malter and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2013).
8Our analyses will be conducted on complete cases, because the number of missing values varies among
variables of interest the sample size across the empirical models will vary somewhat: In the informal care
provision models we use 88,553 (96 percent of the total sample), in the informal care receipt regressions
we use 77,900 observations (85 percent of the total sample).
9This partition is very similar to the one presented by Pommer et al. (2007) and which is designed
to capture the most relevant dimensions of the LTC systems. The main differences to that classification
are that we include two new EU members (Poland and the Czech Republic) and that we assign the
Netherlands to the Central/Continental group. It is acknowledged by Pommer et al. that the Netherlands
has been moving in this direction.
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3.1 Main Outcome Variables
Receiving informal care. The respondents are asked wether they have received any infor-
mal care from someone living within the household or from a friend or family member
outside the household, during the past 12 months. We call the former intra-residential
informal care and the latter extra-residential informal care. In the analysis we are using
an indicator for whether the respondent receives one or both types of informal care. The
reason we are not analysing the intensity is that the frequency of informal receipt is not
recorded for intra-residential informal care and the number of times informal care is given
is not recorded for any of the informal care variables in wave 4. Extra-residential informal
care includes help with personal care, practical household help and help with paperwork.
Intra-residential informal care consists only of help with personal care and the question
is posed only to respondents that are reported to have a mobility limitation.10 This
is natural since practical household chores represent a shared responsibility within the
household and should therefore not be regarded as informal caregiving.
It is of interest to contrast the receipt of extra and intra-residential informal care because
it is likely the two are related to the financial crisis for different reasons. For example,
intra-residential caregivers are often the partner of the person in need of care and therefore
more likely to be older and out of the labor force than extra-residential caregivers. It is
not possible to separate the types extra-residential informal care in wave 4. To make the
samples comparable we assign zero intra-residential care receipt if the respondents are not
asked this question (i.e. respondents that have no mobility problems). As a robustness
test, we will reestimate the informal care receipt models using only respondents who are
asked the question about intra-residential informal care receipt (i.e. respondents reported
to have a mobility problem).
Providing informal care. Also for the provision of informal there is a distinction be-
tween care given within and outside the household. The respondent is asked whether
they provide personal care, practical household help and help with paperwork to a fam-
ily member or friend living outside the household. Respondents answering yes to this
questions are identified as extra-residential caregivers. Intra-residential caregivers are re-
spondents reporting that they have provided personal care over a longer period of time
(i.e. not for short-term sickness spells) to a member of the household. The indicator of
intra-residential care is coded zero if the respondent is reported to live alone. For the
same reason as above we will use indicators for whether the respondent is a caregiver
or not. Table (1) shows descriptive statistics for informal care receipt and caregiving.
As is seen in the table, a substantial share of the sample – approximately 30 percent –
10The respondents are asked whether they have one or more of out of 10 mobility limitations, and
respondents that report to have one or more mobility problem is asked the question about intra-residential
informal care.
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receives informal care and a share of roughly equal size provides informal care. This is
not surprising as our sample are older Europeans and the responsibility of and need for
informal care increases with age.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on key outcome variables
mean sd count
Informal Care Receipt
Overall (=1) 0.21 0.41 77,858
Internal (=1) 0.05 0.21 77,858
External (=1) 0.18 0.39 77,900
Informal Care Provision
Overall (=1) 0.35 0.48 88,459
Internal (=1) 0.06 0.24 88,459
External (=1) 0.31 0.46 88,553
The table shows the means, standard deviations and number of
complete observations (count) for the main outcome variables:
External informal care receipt is an indicator of whether you
have received informal care from someone outside the house-
hold, internal informal care receipt is an indicator of receiving
informal care from someone within the household, and overall
informal care receipt is whether you receive one or both types
of informal care. The same division applies to informal care
provision.
3.2 Measuring the Impact of the Crisis
The Great Recession which was triggered in 2007 by the US subprime mortgage crisis,
was the worst global recession since World War II. It started in December 2007 in the
U.S. and ended there in June 2009; however, only during 2009 the world economy was
in a state of global recession in the sense that a decline in World GDP per capita was
observed. The Great Recession led to a sharp decline in international trade, a rapid rise
in unemployment in many countries, and slumping prices for many commodities.
To measure the impact of the Great Recession we focus on changes in unemployment.
This is in line with the large literature measuring the relationship between macroeco-
nomic fluctuations and health inputs and outcomes (Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2004; Cawley
et al., 2015; Cawley and Simon, 2005), and besides, the previous literature suggests that
unemployment is a better predictor of health outcomes and inputs than other measures of
macroeconomic fluctuations (Cawley et al., 2015; Stuckler et al., 2009). To measure fluc-
tuations in unemployment directly associated with the Great Recession we follow Keegan
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et al. (2013) and quantify the unemployment change in the recessionary period, 2007-
2009. We define a recessionary period for each country following convention of defining
a period of at least two concequitive quarters of negative quarter-on-quarter growth in
seasonally adjusted real GDP as a recession (Newson, 2009; EC, 2010; Keegan et al.,
2013).11 For each country, we define the start of the recession as the last quarter of
positive output growth, which we call the “peak quarter”, and the end of the recession
as the last quarter of negative output growth, which we call the “trough quarter”. Our
measure of unemployment associated with the Great Recession is then the percentage
point change in unemployment from output peak-to-trough.
An overview of the impact of the crisis in some European countries is provided in Table
2. All the data is from the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 2014a,b). We have ordered
the countries included by they European regions they belong to. The first two columns
present the situation in the last year before the crisis, and the following columns picture
the duration and impact of the crisis in the different countries. Clearly, the immediate
effect of the crisis was a sharp downturn in GDP in all countries but Poland. The impact
from peak to trough ranges from 4.0 per cent in France to 8.0 per cent in Denmark. In
general, it is not possible to rank the different regions according to the magnitude or
duration of the recession. However, in terms of unemployment, it seems clear from Table
2 that the countries in the ‘Central’ region have done better than the three other regions.
We see that the recession impact on unemployment rates ranges from -0.4 in Germany
to 8.6 per cent in Spain. Germany was the only country that experienced a decrease in
unemployment in this period. Overall, the crisis impact has a mean of 0.85 per cent and
a standard deviation of 1.74 in our sample (Table (3)).
According to Table (2), the central European countries in our sample weathered the crisis
best. This is confirmed when looking at the Euro area in total (EC, 2010). Spain, Den-
mark, Ireland and the Baltic countries experienced the largest increases in unemployment,
while in Central European countries the unemployment increase was limited. However,
looking at unemployment increases in the recessionary period conceals the different re-
covery paths across Europe. For instance, in Northern Europe the unemployment rates
started to decrease already in 2010 while in Southern Europe the unemployment rates
stabilized at high levels (EC, 2010). To account for the different impacts and recovery
paths across European regions we will include region-specific time trends in the empirical
analyses and do subsample analysis for specific regions.
Since Poland did not experience a recession we are not able to make a country-specific
recession impact measure for Poland. Instead of discarding Poland from the analysis we
calculated our recession measures for Poland using the first quarter in 2008 as the peak
11Keegan et al. (2013) use annual data in defining their recessionary periods. We follow the convention
and use quarterly data which give a more detailed picture of output fluctuations (Newson, 2009).
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Table 2: Crisis Impact by Country.
Pre-Crisis (2007) Crisis Impact
Region GDP Unemployment Duration GDP Unemployment
Country per capita (e ) Percent Quarters Percent Percent
North
Denmark 30,600 3.9 5 8.0 2.8
Sweden 31,200 6.4 6 7.6 1.3
Central
Austria 30,900 4.4 6 5.1 0.9
Belgium 28,900 7.8 4 4.4 0.8
France 26,900 8.4 6 4.0 1.9
Germany 28,800 9.0 5 6.9 -0.4
Netherlands 33,000 3.9 6 4.9 0.4
South
Italy 26,000 5.9 6 7.2 1.0
Spain 26,200 8.0 6 4.6 8.6
East
Czech Republic 20,600 5.9 4 5.5 2.2
Poland 13,600 10.8 0 . .
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quarter and the second quarter of 2009 as the trough quarter, which is defined as the
“official” recession period for the European Union as a whole (Newson, 2009; EC, 2010).
In this period, Poland experienced a 0.4 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate.
Some previous studies include the location specific unemployment rate instead of con-
structing a specific measure of recession severity (Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2004; Cawley et al.,
2015; Cawley and Simon, 2005).12 Increases in the unemployment rate are “loosely” in-
terpreted as measuring macroeconomic downturns/recessions (Ruhm, 2000, 2003). We
are however specifically interested in measuring how variation in the ”bite” of the Great
Recession is associated with informal care supply and demand, and we therefore use
a more technical definition of a downturn. However, for comparative measure we will
re-estimate our models including the country-specific unemployment rate to investigate
differences between the two specifications.
3.3 Control Variables
As the countries included in our analysis differ in many ways which may be related to the
crisis impact, it is desirable to assess whether results are robust to the conditioning on
various control variables. Thus, we consider a wide range of covariates in our empirical
analyses. Our standard set of controls include gender, age and age squared, whether
the respondent lives in the same household as a partner/spouse, marital status (married
vs. others), household size (the number of persons living in the household), number of
children, indicators of primary and secondary education, and wether the respondent is
born in the country of interview.
To explore whether results are confounded by older people’s health, we also consider
care needs in our robustness checks. We use five variable groups to capture care needs:
instrumental activities and activities of daily living, number of listed chronic conditions,
mobility limitations, and self-reported health. The indicators of activities of daily living
include dressing , bathing or showering, eating and cutting up food, walking across a
room and getting in or out of bed. The instrumental activities of daily living are making
telephone calls, taking medications, managing money, shopping for groceries, and prepar-
ing a hot meal.13 Self-reported health is rated in five steps from ‘excellent’ to ‘poor’. The
survey lists typical chronic conditions and for each of the conditions the respondent are
12For instance, Cawley et al. (2015) investigates the effect of the Great Recession on health insurance
coverage in the US by regressing indicators for health insurance coverage on state monthly unemployment
rates over the period 2004-2010
13The instrumental activities and activities of daily living used here are the same as those used to
make the instrumental activities and activities daily living indices in easySHARE, which is a ready-made
panel/repeated cross section of Share waves 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Gruber et al., 2014)
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asked whether they have been diagnosed with them. We include the number of chronic
conditions (out of 12 conditions).14 Finally, we include indicators describing whether the
respondent has problems with the following mobility limitations: walking 100 meters,
walking across a room, climbing several flights of stairs and climbing one flight of stairs.
If the recession weakens the economic well-being of persons in need of care we might
see a substitution effect towards unpaid care from family and friends. To explore these
mechanisms we consider economic well-being in the informal care receipt regressions. To
capture economic-well being we include dummies for country-specific and wave-specific
household income and net-wealth quintiles and whether the respondent reports to have
difficulty in making ends meet (with great difficulty; with some difficulty; fairly easily; or
easily). Income and wealth are deflated using purchasing power parity adjusted exchange
rates provided by the SHARE team, for details see Alcser et al. (2005) and Malter and
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2013). In wave 1, income is reported in gross amounts, while in wave 2
and 4 net income is reported. Therefore, we follow Gorle and van den Bosch (2008) and
use income quintiles, which Gorle and van den Bosch (2008) report will be robust to the
changes in measurement. Household net worth is the sum of all real and financial assets
net of liabilities (Cavasso and Weber, 2013).
Another possible important substitution effect is from formal to informal care. If the
recession leads to cuts in public long-term care services persons in need of long-term
care would, all else equal, be in more need of informal care. The closest substitute to
informal care is probably formal home care (paid home nursing and home help services:
help with household chores); however, the questions regarding formal home care are no
longer asked in wave 4 of SHARE. Therefore, we focus on two of the formal care variables
also considered in Bolin et al. (2008a)15: doctor visits and hospital stays. In addition,
we consider nursing home stays, which are not included by Bolin et al. (2008b) since
they only use Wave 1 and the sample only includes nursing home residents if they were
interviewed before they went to a nursing home (Bakx et al., 2014).
Finally, we take the labour market history of carers into account. The opportunity cost
of time is likely to decrease in a crisis and therefore more people have time to care for
a relative or friend in need of care. To investigate the importance of this mechanism
we would like to investigate the role of labor market status of caregivers. Respondents
who provide informal care report whether they are employed or self-employed.16 In
14The list of conditions have changed among the waves. We follow Gruber et al. (2014) and count
the number of conditions that have been asked in all waves, which are (1) heart attack, (2) high blood
pressure or hypertension, (3) high blood cholesterol, (4) stroke or cerebral vascular disease, (5) Diabetes
or high blood sugar, (6) chronic lung disease, (7) Arthritis, including osteoarthritis, or rheumatism, (8)
Cancer or malignant tumour, (9) Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer, (10) parkinson disease, (11)
cataracts, and (12) hip fracture or femoral fracture
15Bolin et al. (2008a) investigate the substitutability between informal and formal care using SHARE.
16Reporting of the labour market status of the carers of respondents receiving informal care was
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the informal care provision regressions we will use it to define groups for a sub-sample
analysis to investigate the importance of changes in employment status for in informal
care provision. It is important to remember that this is mainly the employment status of
persons who are 50 years and older, and it is not clear cut how a recession will affect the
employment status of employees approaching retirement. As discussed by Meschi et al.
(2013), a negative income and wealth effect caused by a recession might induce people to
postpone retirement. Descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Table (3).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on additional outcomes and controlvariables
mean sd count
Crisis measure
Unemployment change from output peak-to-trough 0.85 1.74 77900
Formal care usuage
Number of doctor visits 7.80 9.94 77900
Hospital stay (=1) 0.16 0.37 77900
Nursing Home Stay (=1) 0.01 0.08 77900
Economic Wellbeing
Household gross income (wave 1) in constant Euro (1000) 43.19 47.82 20369
Household net income (wave 1 and 2) in constant Euro (1000) 29.89 36.85 57531
Household net wealth in constant Euro (1000) 246.71 606.50 77900
Some or great difficulty in making ends meet (=1) 0.36 0.48 77900
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.28 0.45 88553
Unemployed (=1) 0.03 0.17 88553
Health status
Self-reported health (1, excellent; 5, bad) 3.16 1.06 77900
Number of problems with adl out of 10 listed 0.39 1.30 77900
Number of chronic diseases out of 12 listed 1.43 1.35 77900
Number of mobility limitations out of 4 listed 0.54 0.93 77900
Education
Tertiary education education (=1) 0.20 0.40 88553
Secondary education (=1) 0.51 0.50 88553
Demographics
Age in years 65.18 10.34 88553
Female (=1) 0.56 0.50 88553
Living in the same household as a partner (=1) 0.75 0.44 88553
Number of persons living in the household 2.20 1.03 88553
Married (=1) 0.73 0.44 88553
Number of children 2.21 1.42 88553
Born in the country of interview (=1) 0.93 0.26 88553
Many of the additional control variables mentioned above may in principle also be affected
by the crisis – which leads to a methodological challenge. We thus include them in our
analysis in different ways: we use them as outcome variables in order to see whether they
dropped in wave 4.
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appear to be associated with the crisis, we exploit the pre-crisis realisations to conduct
sub-sample analysis, and we include current values in some regressions as robustness
check. In the last case, one of course need to be aware that the estimates may be
biased whenever the crisis has an impact on the covariate. We nevertheless believe these
additional specifications are useful as robustness checks.
4 Empirical Specification
To estimate the relationship between informal care and the country-specific depth of the
Great Recession we estimate the following model using OLS
ICijt = αj + λt +Xitjβ + γ(Ej × dt) + ijt, (1)
where ICijt is an indicator of either receipt or provision of informal care by individual i in
country j at wave t, αj and λt are country and wave fixed effects respectively, Xijt is a row
vector of individual covariates, the term Ej×dt is our measure of the bite of the financial
crisis times a dummy variable for observations after the Great recession (SHARE wave
4), and ijt is the regression error. The variation we exploit is at the country-wave level;
we therefore estimate robust standard errors under the assumption that observations can
be arbitrarily correlated within countries for a given wave, but independent across waves
and countries. This assumption will allow for shocks common to observations within
countries for a given wave.
The parameter of interest, γ, captures the association between the outcome ICijt a one-
point increase in unemployment induced by the crisis. This parameter will thus reflect
the influence of general macroeconomic conditions in a country. As discussed in Section 2,
there are several channels through which a deteriorating economic climate might influence
the supply and demand of informal care. To explore the different mechanisms we will
split the sample according to health status and economic well-being prior to the crisis
(Wave 2), which can be considered to unaffected by the crisis, and we will also introduce
measures of physical care needs, household income and wealth as control variables to see
how they affect the relationship between informal care receipt and out crisis measure. To
explore the role of employment status we will split the sample according to employment
status prior to the crisis (Wave 2).
The empirical specification in equation (1) follows the literature on the effect of macroeco-
nomic conditions on health status and inputs (Ruhm, 2004).17 It exploits within-country
17The specification is strongly advocated by Ruhm (2000, 2003, 2004), showing to evidence that time
and location fixed effects are needed to control for factors having common time trends across locations
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variation to identify the relationship between the recession indicator and availability of
informal care. Controlling for country fixed effects, we cancel out differences between
countries that are constant over time. For example, we know that southern European
countries were hit harder by the financial crisis, and we know from studies that filial
responsibility norms are stronger in southern European countries than elsewhere (Bolin
et al., 2008b; Kotsadam, 2011). The wave specific effects will control for common time
trends across locations that are correlated with informal care availability and macroeco-
nomic conditions, such as general changes in old-age health and technological progress.
The specification however will not control for confounding factors varying within countries
over time. In the recessionary period, Sweden and Denmark experienced a sharper in-
crease in unemployment than Italy, but had a faster and stronger recovery than Italy. To
address such regional differences, we extend the baseline specification with region-specific
linear time trends.
Another potential source of bias comes from unobserved heterogeneity at the individual
level. The example used by Cawley et al. (2015) is that the recession could have hit par-
ticular hard in areas where a high share of the population are relatively poorly educated.
Human capital is known to be correlated with health status and with the ssubsequent
need for long-term care. Exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the SHARE survey, we
follow Cawley and Simon (2005) and Cawley et al. (2015) and include individual fixed
effects into our specification. These models will exploit within-individual variation over
time to identify the relationship between the recession indicator and availability of in-
formal care. Cawley et al. (2015) argues that macroeconomic fluctuations are likely to
be largely exogenous and therefore individual-specific factors should have limited impor-
tance. Our most restrictive/conservative model is then
ICijt = αi + λt +Xitjβ + γ(Ej × dt) + αjt+ ijt, (2)
where αi now represent individual-specific effects and the interaction term αjt are region-
specific linear time trends. This most restrictive specification would thus identify the
impact of the crisis as deviations from the region-specific time trend. If it can be assumed
that countries within a region would have followed a common path in the absence of the
crisis, the estimated γ picks up the crisis effect.
(such as medical technologies), and for factors that are time invariant and location specific (such as
life-style differences).
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5 Results
5.1 Informal Care Receipt
In this section we discuss the results of linear probability models of receiving informal
care on the recession severity indicator. Firstly, we estimate the probability of receiving
informal care from someone outside the household, then we estimate the probability of
receiving informal care from someone within the household, and lastly we estimate an
indicator of the two measures combined. Informal care received within the household is
only asked to respondents who reports to have a mobility problem. As discussed above,
to make the samples comparable we code the indicator of internal informal care receipt
as zero if the respondent reports to have no mobility limitations.18 In all specifications
we control for gender, age, age squared and time-specific effects. In subsequent models,
we add controls that can be considered to be unrelated to our crisis measure: indicators
of primary and secondary education, whether the respondent lives in the same household
as a partner, whether the respondent is born in the country of interview, household size,
number of children, and marital status. In the specifications with individual fixed effects,
variables that do not show variation over time for a given individual are left out of the
analysis. In all tables, we report the mean of the dependent variable to easily evaluate
the size of the predicted effects.
The top panel of Table (4) summarizes the results of estimating the three measures of in-
formal care receipt on the recession severity indicator of the three baseline specifications.
The third row presents the results for the linear probability model with extra-residential
informal care as the dependent variable. The recession severity indicator is positively and
significantly correlated with receiving extra residential informal care across all specifica-
tions. Column (1) shows results when we control for year-specific and country-specific
effects. We find that a one-point change in the unemployment increase from output
peak-to-trough is associated with a 0.74 percentage points increase in the probability of
receiving informal care from someone outside the household. The size of the associa-
tion remains largely unchanged when including individual characteristics and individual-
specific effects in the second and third column respectively. It corresponds to an increase
of about 4 percent at the sample average.
Row (2) in panel 1, summarises the results for informal care provided within the house-
hold. In the two first specifications, controlling for country-specific and year-specific
effects and in Column (2) individual controls, the association is negative and statistically
18An alternative would be to only use respondents who have a mobility problem and therefore answers
both informal care receipt questions. However, as we show below, old age dependency could be an
endogenous variable and could therefore bias our results. In the robustness checks below we reestimate
the model using only respondents who have a mobility problem.
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Table 4: Informal Care Receipt: DID Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Population
DID Overall 0.0055*** 0.0057*** 0.0063*** 0.0064**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
r2 0.064 0.071 0.011 0.011
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
DID Internal -0.0010** -0.0009** 0.0017*** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ymean 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
r2 0.021 0.035 0.012 0.013
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
DID External 0.0074*** 0.0075*** 0.0066*** 0.0078**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.052 0.064 0.009 0.010
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Children > 0
DID Overall 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0055*** 0.0060**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209
r2 0.067 0.074 0.011 0.011
N 70,317 70,317 70,317 70,317
DID Internal -0.0011** -0.0010** 0.0013*** -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ymean 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
r2 0.023 0.036 0.013 0.013
N 70,317 70,317 70,317 70,317
DID External 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0063*** 0.0077**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180
r2 0.055 0.066 0.009 0.010
N 70,355 70,355 70,355 70,355
No children
DID Overall 0.0013 0.0016 0.0142*** 0.0088*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
ymean 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.232
r2 0.042 0.052 0.022 0.023
N 7,541 7,541 7,541 7,541
DID Internal 0.0001 0.0000 0.0066*** 0.0028*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
r2 0.010 0.063 0.030 0.033
N 7,541 7,541 7,541 7,541
DID External 0.0019 0.0022 0.0103** 0.0074
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
ymean 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207
r2 0.032 0.050 0.016 0.016
N 7,545 7,545 7,545 7,545
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X
Regional Trends X
The table shows regression results from a linear probability model of receiving infor-
mal care. The sample includes respondents who report to have one or more mobility
problems, which are the ones that answer the questions about internal and external
informal care receipt. All models control for age, age squared, gender and wave
dummies. Individual controls include whether you live with a partner, whether you
were born in the country of interview, marital status, number of children and in-
dicators of secondary and tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered at
the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
23
significant. A one-point increase in our crisis measure is predicted to decrease the share
of internal informal care receipt by 0.1 percentage points (2.2 percent). The negative
direction of the association is likely to reflect a substitution effect in response to the in-
creased supply of extra-residential informal care. However, when we in addition control
for individual-specific effects the association changes sign and when we allow time trends
to vary between regions in the last Column, the association is no longer statistically sig-
nificant. An intuitive reasoning explaining these results is that co-residential caregivers
are older and more likely to be out of the labor force than extra-residential caregivers,
and are therefore less likely to be experience a lower opportunity cost of time following
the crisis. When we combine the two measures of informal receipt in Row (1) of the top
panel, we find a positive and statistically significant correlation across all specifications.
To further explore whether there is a substitution effect between intra-residential and
extra-residential caregiving we split the sample into respondents with and without chil-
dren. Children are a common source of informal care second only to spousal care (Norton,
2000). The middle panel shows the results for respondents who have children. We find
that the share of respondents who have children and receive extra-residential informal
care increases while the share receiving intra-residential informal care is negatively cor-
related with our crisis measure in three out of four specifications. For the respondents
without children both types of informal caregiving is positively associated with our crisis
measure, as is seen in the bottom panel of the Table.
5.1.1 Regional-Level Analysis
In the following, we will concentrate on informal care received from someone outside the
household. This is to be in line with previous literature and it seems to be consistently
related to our crisis measure as is seen in the results above. Bolin et al. (2008a) and
Bonsang (2009) use external informal care when investigating the relationship between
the use of informal and formal care.
To see how the results vary across different institutional and cultural contexts we follow
Bolin et al. (2008b) and divide the sample into European regions. Bolin et al. (2008b)
find that the intensity of informal caregiving (number of hours of care per caregiver)
exhibits a clear European north-south gradient. Moving from the south to the north,
filial responsibility norms become weaker, expenditure and use of formal long-term care
increases and the opportunity cost of time of women increases. However, the share of
people receiving and giving informal care (extensive margin) is higher in central and
northern Europe (Bolin et al., 2008b,a). An explanation for this may be that more
women in Southern Europe take on the whole caregiving responsibility of dependent
older people, while in Northern Europe where a larger share of women are working, the
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caregiving responsibility is shared among siblings and provided in addition to public
formal services.
Table (5) summarises the results for receiving extra-residential informal care by regions.
There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the recession severity
and the share receiving extra-residential informal care in all regions and across all spec-
ifications. Column (3) presents the results when controlling for time varying individual
characteristics, individual-specific and time-specific effects. The size of the association is
strongest in the Northern region, a one-percentage point increase in recession unemploy-
ment is associated with a 4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving
extra-residential informal care, and weakest in the Southern region, where the predicted
increase is 0.38 percentage points. These associations correspond to an increase of about
21 and 3 percent at the respective sample averages. In the Central and Eastern regions
the association is of similar magnitude to that of the Northern region: 20 and 15 percent
respectively.
5.1.2 The Role of Care Needs, Income and Wealth
As previously discussed, macroeconomic conditions might be associated with care needs.
For instance, Ruhm (2003) finds that medical conditions and activity limitations become
more common when the economy improves, while Bucher-Koenen and Mazzonna (2013),
who investigate the relationship between old age health and the Great recession, find that
self-reported health worsens when the economy contracts. Our results supports Bucher-
Koenen and Mazzonna (2013), in that we find a positive, albeit weak, relationship between
recession severity and the number of difficulties with activities of daily living (see Row
(3) in Appendix Table (A3)): each point increase in unemployment is associated with
0.014 additional ADLs, from a baseline of 0.4. The estimates are very precise and thus
rule out large correlations. Still, the estimates are strongly significant and thus raise the
issue of whether changes in informal care receipt are partly driven by changing needs.
To explore this mechanism, we add controls for health status. Health status controls in-
clude number of listed chronic conditions, mobility limitations, and self-reported health.
Column (5) in the top panel of Table (6) presents the results when using the full sample
and adding health status controls to the specification with time varying individual char-
acteristics, individual-specific, time-specific effects and regional-specific time trends. We
see that the association between recession severity and the probability of receiving extra-
residential informal care is slightly attenuated by about 0.1 percentage points, which
corresponds to about 40 percent of the standard error.
Another channel through which a recession might affect informal care need is through
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Table 5: Informal Care Receipt: DID Results by Region.
(1) (2) (3)
North
DID Crisis 0.0424*** 0.0487*** 0.0422***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
ymean 0.201 0.201 0.201
r2 0.002 0.034 0.006
N 14,286 14,089 14,089
Central
DID Crisis 0.0220*** 0.0227*** 0.0370***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
ymean 0.168 0.168 0.168
r2 0.001 0.038 0.003
N 47,589 46,616 46,616
South
DID Crisis 0.0022* 0.0020 0.0038**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ymean 0.122 0.122 0.122
r2 0.000 0.042 0.007
N 17,164 16,823 16,823
Eastern
DID Crisis 0.0177** 0.0174** 0.0342***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
ymean 0.236 0.236 0.236
r2 0.003 0.038 0.010
N 13,084 12,772 12,772
Year FE X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X
Individual FE X X
The sample includes respondents who report to have one or more mobility
problems, which are the ones that answer the questions about internal and
external informal care receipt. All models control for age, age squared,
gender and wave dummies. The demographic controls include whether
you live with a partner, whether you were born in the country of interview,
marital status, and number of children. Education controls are indicators
of secondary and tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered
at the country-wave level. Northern countries are Sweden and Denmark.
Central countries are Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Austria. Eastern countries are Poland and the Czech Republic. Southern
countries are Italy and Spain. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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changes in household incomes. If the recession leads to a fall in incomes, persons in
need of care might substitute toward unpaid care provided by family and friends.19 To
explore this mechanism, we add controls for economic well-being in Column (6) of Table
6. The variables describing economic well-being are country-specific and wave-specific
household income and net-wealth quintiles and whether the respondent reports to have
difficulty in making ends meet (with great difficulty; with some difficulty; fairly easily;
or easily). The results are by and large the same indicating that possible changes in
economic wellbeing do not explain the association between severity of the recession and
availability of informal care.
Next, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the panel and allow for heterogeneity in the
impact of the crisis between individuals with different levels of needs before the crisis hit.
Activities of daily living is the best predictor of long-term care needs (Norton, 2000). We
therefore follow Adena and Myck (2013) and define someone to be in need of care if they
have 3 or more limitations of daily living.20 Rows (2) and (3) in Table (A3) summarise
the results for the two groups. The association between recession severity and share of
respondents receiving extra-residential informal care is positive and largely statistically
significant across all specifications. In our most restrictive specification (controlling for
individual specific effects, year effects and region-specific time trends; Column (4) in the
table), we see that a one point increase in recession severity is associated with an increase
in informal care receipt by 0.83 percentage points for those without previous limitations
and 0.48 for those with previous needs. These associations correspond to an increase of
2.3 and 5 percent, respectively, at the sample average.21 The size difference might be
driven by those who become limited in wave 4, while those who are limited in activities
of daily living in wave 2 are very unlikely to recover in wave 4.22
A related issue is whether the association between informal care availability and recession
severity depends on economic wellbeing. To explore this we split the sample on whether
respondents report to have difficulty in making ends meet in wave 2, which should be
unrelated to recession severity – but clearly captures the individual’s vulnerability to
the crisis. Adena and Myck (2013) find that subjective poverty defined by respondents
answering that they have “some” or “great” difficulty in making ends meet is a good
predictor of quality of life. We use this variable and re-estimate our models conditioning
19In Row (1) and (2) in Appendix Table (A3), we show that household income and wealth is negatively
associated with recession severity.
20This is called a “bad” health state in Adena and Myck (2013), who use this indicator from SHARE
to look at transitions of physical well-being among elderly.
21The share of respondents who are not in need of long-term care and receives extra-residential informal
care is roughly equal to 0.17, while those who are in need the share is equal to 0.21.
22As an interesting and endogenous side note, the predicted effect of those who become in need in
wave 4 (< 3 ADLs in wave 2 and ≥ 3 ADLs in wave 4) is equal to 3.6 percentage points, corresponding
to an increase of 9 percent at the sample average. This effect is significantly larger than for respondents
who are not considered to be in need.
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Table 6: Informal Care Receipt: DID Results in Subgroups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All
DID Crisis 0.0074*** 0.0075*** 0.0066*** 0.0084*** 0.0074** 0.0075** 0.0080**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.052 0.065 0.009 0.003 0.021 0.022 0.025
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Without limitations, Wave 2
DID Crisis 0.0082*** 0.0080*** 0.0062** 0.0083*** 0.0071** 0.0071** 0.0076**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166
r2 0.034 0.048 0.009 0.002 0.020 0.021 0.025
N 49,420 49,420 49,420 49,420 49,420 49,420 49,420
With limitations, Wave 2
DID Crisis 0.0079*** 0.0084*** 0.0094*** 0.0048 0.0070** 0.0074** 0.0081**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210
r2 0.085 0.098 0.020 0.017 0.035 0.041 0.047
N 28,480 28,480 28,480 28,480 28,480 28,480 28,480
Poor in Wave 2
DID Crisis 0.0110*** 0.0104*** 0.0080*** 0.0081*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ymean 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199
r2 0.044 0.064 0.011 0.005 0.024 0.027 0.030
N 18,471 18,471 18,471 18,471 18,471 18,471 18,471
Non-poor in Wave 2
DID Crisis 0.0060*** 0.0063*** 0.0061** 0.0089** 0.0092** 0.0092** 0.0096**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ymean 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177
r2 0.054 0.065 0.009 0.003 0.021 0.022 0.025
N 59,429 59,429 59,429 59,429 59,429 59,429 59,429
Year FE X X X X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X
Regional Trends X X X X
Health Controls X X X
Income & Wealth Controls X X
Formal Care controls X
All models control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demographic controls include whether you live with
a partner, whether you were born in the country of interview, marital status, and number of children. Education controls are
indicators of secondary and tertiary education. Health status controls include number of listed chronic conditions, mobility lim-
itations, and self-reported health. The variables describing economic well-being are country-specific and wave-specific household
income and net-wealth quintiles. Formal care controls are number of doctor visits and indicators of hospital and nursing home
stay. The standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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on whether respondents report to be “poor” or “not poor” before the recession. The
results are shown in Row (4) and (5) of Table (6). The association with recession severity
is positive and statistically significant across all specifications for both groups. In the
most restrictive specification we see that the predicted increase in the share of poor
recipients of extra-residential informal care is 0.81 percentage points, which corresponds
to roughly 4 percent at the sample average (0.0081/0.2). The corresponding association
among those who are not poor is a little over 5 percent.
5.1.3 Formal Care Utilisation
To investigate whether the recession is associated with formal care use and whether such
an association influences the relationship between informal care and recession severity, we
regress our measure of recession severity on the available variables describing formal care
use: number of doctor visits; an indicator of hospital stays; and an indicator of nursing
home stays. Estimates for these formal care variables are given in Appendix Table (A1).
We find that recession severity is negatively related to doctor visits and hospital stays.
The negative association is statistically significant across all specifications. The proba-
bility of a respondent moving to a nursing home is positively related to recession severity,
but the estimate is very small, insignificant, and precisely estimated.23 Utilisation of
formal care services may thus be one mechanism by which the crisis affects informal care
use; however, the relatively small magnitudes of the estimates suggest this is not the
main part of the story. In order to assess the empirical importance of this mechanism, we
include the formal care variables as controls in the last Column of Table (6). The results
do not alter the main results in any significant way. A reason for this could be that these
formal care variables does not represent formal care services that are close substitutes to
informal care. For instance, Bolin et al. (2008a) does not find any strong substitution
between doctor services, hospital services and informal care.
5.2 Provision of Informal Care
Next, we consider the relationship between informal care provision and macroeconomic
conditions by estimating the probability of providing extra-residential and intra-residential
care on the employment change from output peak-to-trough. In the baseline specifica-
tion we control for age, age-squared, gender, country-specific and year specific effects. We
subsequently add individual controls, individual-specific effects and region-specific time
trends. We distinguish between intra-residential and extra-residential informal care. As
23Remember, this is the probability that someone already interviewed moves into a nursing home at a
later stage and therefore does not represent a representative share of persons living in a nursing home.
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is shown in Table (7), there is a positive correlation between our measure of recession
severity and the share of external caregivers across all specifications. The correlation
between recession severity and internal care provision is negative, while the overall cor-
relation is positive – but none of the results is robust when including region-specific time
trends. However, when only controlling for individual-specific effects, the predicted effect
is significant at the 1 percent level and the direction of the associations after controlling
for region-specific trends is consistently the same.
In our individual fixed effects specification, a one-point increase in recession severity is
associated with an increase in external care provision by 0.85 percentage points (2.7 per
cent; Row 3 of Table (7). The association is reduced to roughly 0.3 percentage points
(1 percent) when including region-specific time trends (Column (4)). The association for
internal care provision is small and statistically insignificant. Although the associations
are small, these results confirm a tendency shown in our models explaining informal care
receipt – an indication that extra-residential informal care substitutes for intra-residential
informal care.
5.2.1 Informal Care Providers by Labour Market Status
In this subsection, we will investigate possible differential predicted effects of informal
care provision on recession severity by subgroups according to labor market status. The
apparent logic is that an increased unemployment rate reduces the opportunity cost of
time, which in turn increases the supply of informal care – although it is not certain that
our crisis measure will move one-to-one with the opportunity cost of time of our middle-
aged sample.24 If variation in our crisis measure is mainly driven by unemployment at
lower ages it might have opposite impact on opportunity cost of time for our sample. For
example, older individuals might postpone retirement because of uncertainty regarding
the economic situation or unemployed close to retirement might cease looking for work.
These examples in isolation would imply an inverse relationship between our measure
of crisis severity and unemployment rate in our sample (i.e. higher opportunity cost of
time).
To explore the strength of the relationship between crisis severity and unemployment
we regress an indicator of unemployment and employment on our measure of recession
severity. The results are shown in Appendix Table (A3). There is a positive association
between recession severity and unemployment. However, the association is not statisti-
cally significant when controlling for region-specific time trends. A one-point increase in
24To recapitulate, our proxy of crisis severity is the increase in the unemployment rate for ages 15 to
74 from output peak-to-trough. This is to best describe the general economic climate, which will be most
relevant to capture all channels through which adverse economic conditions might be related to informal
care availability.
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Table 7: Informal Care Provision: DID Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Population
DID Overall 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 0.0083*** 0.0024 0.0023 0.0024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352
r2 0.031 0.036 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459 87,524
DID Internal -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
r2 0.002 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459 87,524
DID External 0.0050*** 0.0053*** 0.0085*** 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311
r2 0.044 0.050 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
N 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553 87,616
Working Wave 2
DID Overall 0.0108** 0.0109** 0.0124*** 0.0082* 0.0082* 0.0078*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ymean 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458
r2 0.011 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.020
N 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,859
DID Internal 0.0019** 0.0020** 0.0004 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
r2 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
N 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,988 15,859
DID External 0.0067 0.0067 0.0089 0.0049 0.0049 0.0050
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ymean 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436
r2 0.011 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.021
N 15,997 15,997 15,997 15,997 15,997 15,868
Not Working Wave 2
DID Overall 0.0020** 0.0023** 0.0073*** 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ymean 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329
r2 0.028 0.034 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012
N 72,471 72,471 72,471 72,471 72,471 71,665
DID Internal -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
r2 0.001 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.022
N 72,471 72,471 72,471 72,471 72,471 71,665
DID External 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 0.0084*** 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ymean 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283
r2 0.041 0.047 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
N 72,556 72,556 72,556 72,556 72,556 71,748
Year FE X X X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Regional Trends X X X
Health Controls X X
Income & Wealth Controls X
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demographic controls include whether
you live with a partner, whether you were born in the country of interview, marital status, and number of children.
Education controls are indicators of secondary and tertiary education. Health status controls include number of
listed chronic conditions and self-reported health. The variables describing economic well-being are country-specific
and wave-specific household income and net-wealth quintiles and whether the respondent reports to have some or
great difficulty in making ends meet. The standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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recession severity is associated with roughly 0.3 percentage point increase in the probabil-
ity of being unemployed. Roughly three percent of the sample reports to be unemployed,
therefore this represents an increase of about 10 percent. The association is reduced by
about half when controlling for individual-specific and region-specific time trends. Row
(2) of the Table, show that there generally is a negative relationship between our mea-
sure of crisis severity and employment. Here as well, including region-specific time trends
reduces the strength and renders the association insignificant. Nevertheless, the results
suggest that to some extent, our crisis indicator captures the opportunity cost of time of
the respondents. To look for nonlinear relationships we reestimate the models separately
for those who are employed and unemployed before the recession (wave 2). Among the
employed, which are most likely to experience a change in the opportunity cost of time
in wave 4 compared to wave 2, a one-percentage increase in our crisis measure is associ-
ated with a 1.24 percentage point increase in the probability of providing informal care,
which corresponds to roughly 2.7 percent at the sample average. Among those who are
unemployed in wave 2 the corresponding predicted effects are 0.73 percentage points (2.2
%). Hence, it seems that the positive correlation between informal care provision and
recession unemployment is not entirely explained by opportunity cost of time.
5.2.2 Sensitivity analyses
In Appendix Table (A2) we show results for informal care receipt when using respondents
who are asked whether they receive both types of informal care (i.e. respondents reported
to have a mobility limitation). As is seen in the Table, the direction and significance of
the results are intact. The results seem to be somewhat stronger, which might indicate
that a large share of the observed increase in informal care receipt is driven by increase
in care and not for practical for more practical household chores.
To see how sensitive our results are to our choice of crisis indicator we reestimate our main
models using three alternative measures of macroeconomic fluctuations: The absolute
decrease in real GDP from output peak-to-trough, unemployment rate and real GDP
per capita. Ruhm (2000, 2003, 2004); Cawley et al. (2015); Cawley and Simon (2005)
use a specification which includes linearly the location specific unemployment rate, and
Cawley and Simon (2005) also use real GDP per capita as a check of the predicted effects
measured by unemployment. The results are shown in Appendix Tables (A5) and (A6) for
informal care receipt and informal care provision respectively. When we use the absolute
decrease in real GDP and real GDP per capita we generally get estimates in the same
direction as when we used recession unemployment increase. However, the associations
seem to be weaker when it comes to statistically significance. When we linearly include
real GDP per capita the results are similar and show a significant, both substantially
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and statistically, negative relationship with both informal are receipt and provision i.e.
a better economy reduces the availability of informal care. This is confirmed in the
specification using linear unemployment rate as the independent variable.
6 Conclusion
Informal care is still the main source of long-term care in most European countries (either
as a sole or combined source of care); however our knowledge of the determinants of
informal caregiving is still incomplete. Recessions provide quasi-experimental evidence
to examine the impact of employment shocks on the availability of informal care. We have
argued that the effect of a recession on informal caregiving is mediated by several different
mechanisms, the relative importance of which remain an open, and empirical issue. This
paper taken advantage of the large variation in both the exposure to the great recession in
Europe (Hurley et al., 2011) and models of caregiving (Costa-font et al., 2015), alongside
the associated austerity measures.
Accordingly, we have shown that the Great Recession likely affected a host of different
determinants on informal caregiving on the demand and supply sides, as well as factors
determining the matching between carers and recipient on this ‘market’. Demand-side
factors include the possibility that the recession affected physical care needs, substitution
between formal and informal care, and income effects due to drops in incomes of older
people. Amongst supply-side factors, in particular the opportunity cost of potential
carers appears to be important, even though it is not obvious that a recession has the
same impact on this group as on younger individuals. Indeed, the recession might have
opened up opportunities for part-time and more flexible jobs that are more compatible
with caregiving, or even to take advantage of caregiving allowance funding as an extra
source of income. However, evidence of the latter seems to be questionable (Bryan, 2012).
Our analysis shows that the downturn was associated with a marked increase in informal
care receipt, and that this change was almost entirely driven by informal care from outside
the household. Even though we do observe a small association between the severity of
the crisis and the prevalence of functional limitations among older people, the magnitude
is too small to be responsible for the increase in informal care receipt. We also find some
crude evidence of substitution from formal to informal care services, but also this effect
appears to be too small to be one of the main explanations. Consistent with this, we
do not find any evidence suggesting that poverty is an important driver of the results.
Instead, it does indeed seem to be the case that the opportunity cost of potential carers is
one of the main factors determining the surge in informal care receipt: only for individuals
working in wave two do we observe a significant increase in informal care provision, and
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the association is very similar in magnitude to the coefficient estimated for informal care
receipt.
As in previous studies, we find a strong North/South divide in Europe. When comparing
estimates for different European regions, the impact of the crisis appears to have been
stronger in the North and weaker in the South, with the countries in between being
closer to Scandinavia than to Southern Europe. This might be unexpected given that
the countries in the north have much more extensive provision of formal care. However,
considering the labour market attachment of relatively old workers in different European
regions, this North/South gradient does make perfect sense in the light of opportunity
costs being an essential determinant of informal care provision.
One aspect which we have not taken into account in our analysis is that population ageing
advances from different levels and at different speeds in the different countries. This is
not a big obstacle to the empirical analysis, which is conducted at the individual level and
conditional on the age and sex composition of the older part of the population. However,
dependency ratios and the like may of course matter a lot for the availability of formal
care, and for how the political process and the public sector deal with competing demands
from different demographic groups. Amongst the countries included in this study, the
South and the East experienced a particularly rapid increase in the 80+ population in
the aftermath of the crisis; whereas the Scandinavian countries and in particular Sweden
have been essentially flat. These diverging demographic trends represent a puzzle in
the sense that we would have expected the needs to grow faster in the South during
the crisis – as a growing number of old people competed for the austerity-struck public
resources – which in turn should have strengthened the association between the crisis
and informal caregiving in those countries. The fact that we observe the opposite thus
corroborate the conclusion from above that the Southern European LTC systems are
largely isolated from labour market shocks. In addition, when seen in the light of these
demographic trends, our results also suggest that Southern European LTC systems are
much more compartmentalised between formal and informal care than their Scandinavian
counterparts.
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Appendix
Table A1: Formal Care Utilisation: DID Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Doctor Visits
DID Crisis -0.2501*** -0.2568*** -0.2178*** -0.2689*** -0.2844*** -0.2815***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.063) (0.059) (0.058)
ymean 7.797 7.797 7.797 7.797 7.797 7.797
r2 0.015 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.043 0.039
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Hospital Stays
DID Crisis -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0041*** -0.0042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165
r2 0.013 0.015 0.006 0.006 0.028 0.027
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Nursing Home
DID Crisis 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
r2 0.012 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.019 0.011
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Year FE X X X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Regional Trends X X X
Health Controls X X
Income & Wealth Controls X
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demographic controls include whether
you live with a partner, whether you were born in the country of interview, marital status, and number of children.
Education controls are indicators of secondary and tertiary education. Health status controls include instrumental
activities and activities of daily living, number of listed chronic conditions, mobility limitations, and self-reported
health. The variables describing economic well-being are country-specific and wave-specific household income and
net-wealth quintiles and whether the respondent reports to have some or great difficulty in making ends meet. The
standard erros are clustered at the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2: Informal Care Receipt: DID Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Population
DID Overall 0.0078*** 0.0083*** 0.0097*** 0.0060**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
r2 0.060 0.067 0.012 0.012
N 44,820 44,145 44,145 44,145
DID Internal -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0018** -0.0025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
r2 0.015 0.042 0.019 0.021
N 45,013 44,323 44,323 44,323
DID External 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0100*** 0.0089***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.259
r2 0.052 0.070 0.011 0.011
N 44,900 44,223 44,223 44,223
Children > 0
DID Overall 0.0079*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0053*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.312
r2 0.064 0.071 0.013 0.013
N 40,400 39,763 39,763 39,763
DID Internal -0.0023 -0.0019 0.0008 -0.0033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092
r2 0.018 0.041 0.020 0.021
N 40,580 39,928 39,928 39,928
DID External 0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0099*** 0.0090***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ymean 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255
r2 0.056 0.074 0.012 0.012
N 40,472 39,833 39,833 39,833
No children
DID Overall 0.0053** 0.0049* 0.0185*** 0.0112**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ymean 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338
r2 0.031 0.041 0.019 0.022
N 4,420 4,382 4,382 4,382
DID Internal 0.0034 0.0026 0.0117*** 0.0058**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ymean 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
r2 0.004 0.106 0.039 0.046
N 4,433 4,395 4,395 4,395
DID External 0.0033 0.0033 0.0082*** 0.0049
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
ymean 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287
r2 0.027 0.049 0.011 0.012
N 4,428 4,390 4,390 4,390
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X
Regional Trends X
The table shows regression results from a linear probability model of receiving infor-
mal care. The sample includes respondents who report to have one or more mobility
problems, which are the ones that answer the questions about internal and external
informal care receipt. All models control for age, age squared, gender and wave
dummies. Individual controls include whether you live with a partner, whether you
were born in the country of interview, marital status, number of children and in-
dicators of secondary and tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered at
the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A3: Additional Outcomes: DID Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
DID Crisis -0.9034* -0.8430* -0.4031 -0.0444
(0.454) (0.466) (0.494) (0.324)
ymean 29.891 29.891 29.891 29.891
r2 0.027 0.087 0.004 0.006
N 57,531 57,531 57,531 57,531
Wealth
DID Crisis -6.0926 -5.5602 -3.8731 -3.0190
(5.061) (5.121) (5.878) (4.931)
ymean 246.707 246.707 246.707 246.707
r2 0.010 0.030 0.016 0.019
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
ADL Limitations
DID Crisis 0.0137*** 0.0144*** 0.0187*** 0.0135***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ymean 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.389
r2 0.116 0.124 0.066 0.067
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X
Regional Trends X
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demographic
controls include whether you live with a partner, whether you were born in the country
of interview, marital status, and number of children. Education controls are indicators of
secondary and tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered at the country-wave
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A4: Labor Market Status: DID Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed
DID Crisis 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0014** 0.0010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
r2 0.026 0.032 0.004 0.004
N 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553
Employed
DID Crisis -0.0041*** -0.0034*** 0.0022 -0.0013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ymean 0.276 0.276 0.276 0.276
r2 0.401 0.414 0.074 0.077
N 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X
Regional Trends X
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demo-
graphic controls include whether you live with a partner, whether you were born in
the country of interview, marital status, and number of children. Education controls
are indicators of secondary and tertiary education. The standard erros are clustered
at the country-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A5: Informal Care Receipt: Different crisis measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute fall in real GDP during the crisis
DID Overall 0.003422 0.001577 0.001626 0.002244
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
r2 0.064 0.010 0.010 0.011
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
DID Internal 0.001127 -0.000176 -0.000285 0.001530**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
r2 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.013
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
DID External 0.002955 0.001729 0.001868 0.001947
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.051 0.007 0.009 0.009
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Real GDP – linear specification
Overall -0.000014*** -0.000013*** -0.000013*** -0.000016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
r2 0.065 0.011 0.011 0.011
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
Internal -0.000001 -0.000003** -0.000003** -0.000000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
r2 0.021 0.008 0.013 0.013
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
External -0.000015*** -0.000013*** -0.000012*** -0.000017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.052 0.008 0.010 0.010
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Unemployment rate – linear specification
Overall 0.002970*** 0.002324*** 0.002244** 0.001661
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
r2 0.064 0.010 0.011 0.011
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
Internal -0.000805*** 0.000459 0.000588* -0.000792*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
r2 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.013
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
External 0.004318*** 0.002814*** 0.002622*** 0.002920**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.052 0.008 0.009 0.009
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X X
Regional Trends X
The table shows regression results from a linear probability model of receiving informal care.
All models control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The demographic controls
include whether you live with a partner, whether you were born in the country of interview,
marital status, and number of children. Education controls are indicators of secondary and
tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A6: Informal Care Provision: Different crisis measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute fall in real GDP during the crisis
DID Overall 0.00093 -0.00284 -0.00284 -0.00206
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352
r2 0.030 0.010 0.010 0.012
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459
DID Internal 0.00110 0.00010 0.00010 0.00235***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
r2 0.002 0.016 0.016 0.016
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459
DID External 0.00065 -0.00188 -0.00188 -0.00287
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ymean 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311
r2 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.017
N 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553
Real GDP – linear specification
Overall -0.00001*** -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352
r2 0.031 0.011 0.011 0.012
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459
Internal -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
r2 0.002 0.016 0.016 0.016
N 88,459 88,459 88,459 88,459
External -0.00001** -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311
r2 0.044 0.016 0.016 0.017
N 88,553 88,553 88,553 88,553
Unemployment rate – linear specification
Overall 0.002970*** 0.002324*** 0.002244** 0.001661
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
r2 0.064 0.010 0.011 0.011
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
Internal -0.000805*** 0.000459 0.000588* -0.000792*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ymean 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
r2 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.013
N 77,858 77,858 77,858 77,858
External 0.004318*** 0.002814*** 0.002622*** 0.002920**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ymean 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
r2 0.052 0.008 0.009 0.009
N 77,900 77,900 77,900 77,900
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Individual controls X X X
Individual FE X X X
Regional Trends X
The table shows regression results from a linear probability model of receiving extra-residential
informal care. All models control for age, age squared, gender and wave dummies. The
demographic controls include whether you live with a partner, whether you were born in the
country of interview, marital status, and number of children. Education controls are indicators
of secondary and tertiary education. The standard errors are clustered at the country-wave
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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